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ETHICS OF EXPERT EVIDENCE1 
[This is a pre-publication draft. The published version of this paper can be found as Millett, S. (2013). Ethics of Expert Evidence. The 
Australian Law Journal, Volume 87/9, September, pp 628-638.] 
Abstract.   
The use of expert evidence in courts has been problematic for many years and a focus on the ethics of witnesses has given 
rise to the widespread introduction of rules governing how experts may behave. But, in addition to the ethics of witnesses, 
the ethics of expert evidence also encompasses the ethics of lawyers; the financial and other costs of using experts; the 
use, or misuse, of science; the way claims to truth are made; and the impact on the law itself. In short, despite recent 
clarification of rules for witnesses, there remain significant issues with how the legal system makes use of expert 
testimony. This paper explores some of those issues. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The reliance on and reliability of expert evidence, and the ways in which experts are used, have 
proven to be significant problems in courts over many years. For example, in the 1999 Freckelton 
Report2 on expert evidence, of the 244 judges who responded to the study 85 per cent said ‘they 
had encountered partisanship in expert witnesses’ …Of those… ‘40 per cent said that this was a 
significant problem for the quality of fact-finding in their court,’ and 25 per cent of respondents said 
they encountered bias often. 3  
In a speech referring to that report Justice Sperling noted that  
In the ordinary run of personal injury work and to a lesser extent in other work, the expert witnesses are so 
partisan that their evidence is useless. Cases then have to be decided on probabilities as best one can.4 
Since Justice Sperling’s speech there have been significant changes in the way experts are used in 
Australian courts.5 Many of the worst abuses of the process of using expert evidence have begun to 
                                                             
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Conference of Planning and Environment Courts 
and Tribunals. Dunsborough, Western Australia in August 2012. I am grateful to the participants for 
suggestions.  
2 Freckelton I, Reddy P and Selby H, Australian Judicial Perspectives on Expert Evidence: An Empirical Study 
(Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 1999). 
3 Sperling H, Expert Evidence: the Problem of Bias and Other Things (Paper presented at the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales Annual Conference, Terrigal NSW, 1999), 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_court/ll_sc.nsf/vwPrint1/SCO_speech_sperling_030999. 
Accessed August 2012. 
4 Sperling, n 3.  
5 See for example: (1) The Law Society of Western Australia, Ethical and Practice Guidelines, (Perth WA, 2012) 
which, in S.10 urges practitioners to familiarise themselves with the WA Bar Association’s Best Practice Guide 
(2009), which itself is incorporated into the Supreme Court Consolidated Practice Directions at 109 [4.5(9)]. 
S.10.2 of the Guidelines states that ‘The golden rule is never to “coach” a witness’; (2) Legal Profession Act 
2008 (WA) and the Legal Profession Conduct Rules (2010) issued pursuant to that Act. Note especially Rule 5, 
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be addressed, but many problems remain and some of them go to the heart of our legal system 
itself.  
I will address these in various ways in what follows, but want to note that I approach this topic as a 
moral philosopher. And while I must necessarily address the way the law views, constrains and uses 
expert evidence, the focus is the ethics of expert evidence.   
The Australian Family Court6 has characterised the problems of expert evidence primarily in terms of 
the ethics of witnesses, viz: partisanship or lack of objectivity; experts exceeding their area of 
expertise; clarity of evidence; but also notes there are issues with costs and delays. However, the 
ethical issues can be characterised in a number of ways in addition to the ethics of witnesses. They 
can be seen, for example, in terms of: the ethics of lawyers; the costs of using experts; the use, or 
misuse, of science; misrepresentation of expertise; the way claims to truth are made; and the impact 
on the law itself as claims to truth accepted in a court become precedents.  
Opinion evidence is usually acceptable only from witnesses with special skills or knowledge. In 
Australia this is spelled out in the Evidence Act (Commonwealth) 1995 which permits the use of 
opinion evidence from a person possessing ‘specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, 
study or experience,’ provided the opinion is ‘wholly or substantially based on that knowledge’.7 In 
the United States, from where much of the literature on the ethics of expert evidence emanates, 
clarification of the use of expert opinion can be found in Rule 702 of Federal Rules of Evidence 
(1974). 
EPISTEMOLOGY AND EVIDENCE 
As the Australian jurist Sir Owen Dixon observed, the law relies on particular technique and logic8. As 
far as logic goes the law requires, for example, syllogistic reasoning when it first finds the applicable 
law, then interprets and applies the law9; and it requires analogical reasoning when arguing on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
which requires that ‘a practitioner’s duty to the court and the administration of justice is paramount and 
prevails to the extent of inconsistency with any other duty…’; Rule 32(2)(b) ‘if the practitioner is aware of any 
persuasive authority that the practitioner reasonably believes might be against the client’s case, inform the 
court of that authority’; Rule 39 (1) ‘A practitioner must not suggest to or advise a witness that the witness 
should give false evidence’, (2) ‘A practitioner must not make a suggestion to, or condone a suggestion being 
made to, a prospective witness about the content of evidence which the witness should give at any stage of 
the proceedings’; and Rule 40 which prohibits practitioners from conferring with two witnesses together if 
such a conference may affect the witnesses’ testimony.  
6 Family Court of Australia, The Changing Face of the Expert Witness (2002). 
7 Family Court of Australia, n 6, p 2. 
8 Dixon O, “Concerning Judicial Method” in Woinarski S, (ed), Jesting Pilate and Other Papers and Addresses by 
the Rt Honourable Sir Owen Dixon (2
nd
 ed, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 1997). 
9
 Preston B, “The Art of Judging Environmental Disputes” (2008) 12 S Cross U Law Rev p 108. 
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basis of precedents10 (the judgement in a past case should apply to the current case because the 
cases are similar in specified respects).  
When opinion evidence is presented, the Courts require that it be based on sound claims to fact. But 
although relying on experts’ claims to fact is important, it may not be enough. In the epistemological 
approach dominant in the Western world, to make a claim that a statement is true involves the 
interrelationship of three elements: belief, truth and justification. While each of the three conditions 
is necessary and together give knowledge a normative dimension, 11  justification has become the 
major focus in science and the courts. We commit ‘epistemic irresponsibility’12 if we assert 
knowledge without adequate justification. Joseph Sanders argues that 
behavior that is irresponsible in this way is unethical when it occurs within settings where individuals hold 
themselves...out as having knowledge upon which others rely. It is unethical for expert witnesses to hold or 
express unjustified beliefs.13 
Justification has become the major focus for evaluating knowledge claims, but how are the courts to 
know how well-justified a claim is? Two American precedents are instructive here, the 1923 case 
Frye vs United States (293 F. 1013, 1014 [DC Cir, 1923]) and the 1993 case Daubert vs Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Inc (509 US 579 [1993]). Frye basically ‘passes the buck’ back to the expert field and 
accepts the standards – the intellectual rigour – the expert field imposes on itself.14 Daubert moves 
beyond the requirement for experts to apply the same rigour for the courts that they would apply in 
other areas of their professional lives and asks in addition whether the expert evidence is itself 
based on a sufficiently rigorous foundation. For David Faigman,  
... The whole point of Daubert was to require courts to assess the fields themselves and not defer to the guilds 
that bring their so-called expertise to the courtrooms.
15  
If courts rely on professional associations to determine the basis on which the quality of expert 
evidence is to be judged, they are likely to run into two sorts of problems: if the expert’s discipline 
sets a low bar for justification then the standards may be too low for legal purposes; and if the 
professional standards of a discipline are too stringent then experts may be prevented from reaching 
the sorts of opinions as to facts that should be used in civil trials.16  
The courts need, in effect, to establish a ‘Goldilocks’ zone where the level of justification is ‘just 
right’.  How the courts can do so is problematic, but they at least need to recognise that there are 
                                                             
10 Preston, n 9 
11 Sanders J, “Expert Witness Ethics” (2007) Fordham Law Rev, 76(3) 1543. 
12 Williams M, “Problems of Knowledge: a Critical Introduction to Epistemology” (2001) 16-19 in Sanders, n 11, 
p 1541. 
13 Sanders, n 11, p 1542. 
14 Sanders, n 11, p 1546 n 29. 
15 Sanders, n 11, p 1547, citing Faigman D L, “The Law's Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations on 
the Law's Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution” (2000) 57 Wash. & Lee Law Rev pp 661, 667. 
16
 Sanders, n 11, p 1547. 
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limits to what can legitimately be asked of experts and the logic on which their assertions are based. 
For example, science may be able to establish an empirical fact, but encounters logical problems 
with what can be done with those facts because there are problems with any use of inductive logic – 
the process used to take us from singular facts to theories. As Karl Popper observed:  
no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all 
swans are white.
 17  
An expert called to provide evidence may be able to demonstrate that sand particles or seed pods 
were found with a deceased person and may be able to show that the sand or seeds share significant 
characteristics with sand and seeds collected at the deceased’s house, but is likely never to be able 
to say with certainty, based on the presence of the sand and seeds in the deceased’s clothing, that 
the deceased was at her home when she died. It is not within the ability of science to make a claim 
of certainty on the basis of such evidence. An expert witness simply cannot attest to being certain 
about a theory based on singular facts, and to ask a witness to do so is asking him or her to defy 
logic. Counsel is likely, under our system, to push an expert to confirm that he cannot be certain that 
the presence of X or Y means that event Q happened at place P – as was done in the murder trial of 
Perth barrister Lloyd Rayney (The State of Western Australia v Rayney [No 3] [2012] WASC 404 (INS 
83 of 2011).18 Counsel has simply asked the expert to confirm a truth of inductive logic – that no 
series of observations can generate a theory we can assert with perfect certainty – but in so doing 
has introduced an imputation that the evidence is somehow flawed.19 This may point to a mismatch 
between the requirements of the law and the capacity of science, but there is an ethical issue when 
counsel introduce such an imputation knowing that science cannot deliver certainty of the type 
requested. 
In addition to any problems with relying on theories based on a series of singular facts, there are 
further problems with claims to knowledge based in experience. For the American logician Willard 
Quine modern empiricism has been conditioned by two false dogmas: The first is ‘a belief in some 
fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of 
                                                             
17 Popper K, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge, London, 1992) p 27. 
18 See, for example, Jones C and Emery K, “Scientist Is Quizzed on Forensics”in The West Australian (Perth), 14 
August 2012. The lead paragraph states “A scientist called by prosecutors in Lloyd Rayney’s trial for wilful 
murder agreed yesterday that he could not say with certainty that sand particles found in a seed pod on 
Corryn Rayney’s body had come from the couple’s Como home or that her boots were dragged across the 
front yard.” 
19 We are left with an opinion based on the balance of probabilities. But there is a problem with the appeal to 
probability too, as Popper shows. ‘If a certain degree of probability is to be assigned to statements based on 
inductive inference, then this will have to be justified by invoking a new principle of induction, appropriately 
modified. And this new principle in its turn will have to be justified, and so on.’ Popper, n 17, p 30. 
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matters of fact, and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact’.20  The second false dogma, the 
dogma of reductionism, is relevant here. That dogma comes down to ‘the belief that each 
meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate 
experience’.21 If Quine is right, and his argument is widely acclaimed, then a process that relies 
heavily, if not completely, on claims based in immediate experience may well be flawed. We should 
recognise that science and its methods are valuable, but should not ask of science what it cannot 
deliver. We must beware to rely on good science, but also be aware that even the best science may 
not generate complete certainty.  
We, as a society, need also to understand that science has been taken up as an ideological force akin 
to a religion, where the claims of science are taken as necessarily true and unimpeachable – and, 
more worryingly, that science is the only correct way of knowing. There are many ways of knowing, 
but a legal system that ties itself too closely to truth claims based in experience will fail to see this. 
Traditional knowledge in indigenous communities, for example, will likely fail the objectivity test of 
science, but still have a valid claim to be considered knowledge. And the same may be said of the 
beliefs within many other cultures and communities. 
There is also the problem of what we are able to do with scientific evidence once we have it. Science 
is frequently appealed to as an arbiter, but no matter how good the science is we are always faced 
with what has become known as Hume’s law:22 the view – hotly contested, but still live – that it is 
impossible to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. In other words, there is no logical bridge over the gap 
between fact and value. For Hume, moral distinctions are not derived from reason, but from some 
moral sense. This leaves science able to make a claim about what is – that is, to assert a fact – but 
unable to tell us what we ought to do with any fact. 
It is important to keep an open mind about the sorts of claims science can make, how science makes 
those claims and what we should do with the claims. We need also to be aware that science can be 
misused. The lack of certainty inherent in inductive claims – general propositions that are derived 
from specific examples – may be used disingenuously to assert that one set of claims may well be as 
sound as another. This is a trap because there is no necessary equivalence between the claims of 
poor science and those of methodologically sound science. We can legitimately say that one set of 
claims is stronger, has a greater claim to be true, than others. We are not bound to accept the 
equivalence of claims, indeed, we must not be so bound. The issue of climate science is one instance 
where, to our collective detriment, views opposing the idea of anthropogenic climate change are 
                                                             
20 Quine W, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in Quine W, From a Logical Point of View (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass, 1980) p 20. 
21 Quine, n 20. 
22
 Hume D, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) Selby-Bigge L (ed) (2
nd
 ed, Clarendon Press, 1978).  Book III, Part 
1, sections i, ii.  
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introduced in a way that asserts that they have equal validity to the vast amount of science that 
shows humans have influenced the climate of the planet, and continue to do so. And when climate 
change skeptics assert that human-caused climate change is an unproven claim they exploit, and 
misrepresent, one of Popper’s key propositions about science – that the theories generated by 
scientists cannot be proven true, they may only be falsified.   
Bad science can emerge as well as good, and it is possible for any party to use bad science in the 
service of a client. For example, the tobacco industry has, for 40 years, ‘exploited the margins of 
science’ and ‘used scientists to conduct studies for it establishing the absence of a link between 
cancer and the use of tobacco.’23 Bad science may take many forms and knowing what is good and 
bad is difficult for non-specialists, which is why courts may need to rely on experts. But experts – 
despite a requirement to ‘provide independent assistance to the court by way of objective unbiased 
opinion in relations to matters within [their] expertise’24 – may mislead the court: for example, by 
relying on science that has not been adequately tested; by emphasising some elements of research 
findings and excluding or de-emphasising others; or through misrepresentation. And despite 
requirements to serve the court25 and not one or other of the parties, expert witnesses will feel 
significant pressure to take on an advocacy role rather than a disinterested educative role. I will look 
at that pressure shortly. 
If experts mislead the court – whether intentionally, unintentionally, by omission, by emphasis or 
other means – it is not just the case at hand that may feel the effects. It is possible for ‘a particular 
form of scientific testimony [to] gain legal acceptance without ever undergoing independent 
rigorous scientific or legal scrutiny.’26 And the (untested) claims made in such testimony may find 
their way into other cases through precedent.  
COSTS OF EXPERT EVIDENCE 
In addition to the already-mentioned problems for courts in hearing expert evidence, there are 
significant costs associated with the use of experts. This is an ethical issue for the courts as 
unfettered use of experts may extend proceedings unreasonably and give wealthier parties a distinct 
advantage.27 Costs may be more than financial. Selective use of expert testimony can skew cases and 
                                                             
23 Sales B, “Institutional Constraints On The Ethics Of Expert Testimony” (1993) Ethics & Behavior, 3 (3-4), p 
231. Sales cites Freedman A and Cohen L, “Smoke And Mirrors: How Cigarette Makers Keep Health Question 
'Open' Year After Year”, Wall Street Journal (New York, 11 February 1993) p A60.   
24 The Ikarian Reefer (1993) QB (Comm Ct) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 68. 
25 Guide for experts giving evidence in the State Administrative Tribunal (2012) 
http://www.sat.justice.wa.gov.au/_files/Expert_Evidence_Brochure.pdf accessed April 2013.  
26 Sales, n 23, p 232. One of the examples Sales gives is the so-called ‘battered woman’ defence to murder. 
27
 The Family Court of Australia notes that “uncontrolled use of expert witnesses is costly” and can add to the 
length of a trial. It further notes that the financial costs of employing experts provides a strategic advantage to 
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lead to judgments that are less than just. There may also be costs to the judicial system itself when 
ordinary people feel they have been ‘done over’ by the expert evidence of opposing parties and lose 
trust in the legal system. This cost to the legal system itself can best be understood through the 
notions of role morality, moral distance and narrowed moral universe. 
Most expert witnesses are likely to be professionals of one sort or another: medical doctors; 
engineers; planners; social workers and so on.  To be a professional is to take on a social role, but 
professions, in the main, also operate from what might be called a role-morality which involves both 
moral distance28 from the concerns of ordinary or private morality and a significantly narrowed 
moral universe that, in some respects, is easy to inhabit because it is less complicated and less 
ambiguous than the moral world of ordinary daily life.29   
One aspect of the role morality is that built in to the very role of a professional is the need to ‘prefer 
in a variety of ways the interests of the client or patient over those of individuals generally’.30 Each 
professional who comes to a court as an expert witness brings his or her own professional morality 
and a strong inclination – some might say obligation – to prefer the interests of clients over others. 
But expert witnesses also enter the environment of lawyers where representing a client in a 
preferential way is a duty that comes with their profession. That preferential treatment of the client 
in an adversarial legal system can tend to make the lawyer appear amoral or even immoral when 
dealing with others. And the narrowed moral universe and role morality of lawyers is not always 
obvious to them: they have become accustomed to the normalised practices of a normal working 
day and become used to what they do. In the words of G.K. Chesterton  
…they do not see the prisoner in the dock; all they see is the usual man in the usual place. They do not see the 
awful court of judgment; they only see their own workshop. 
31
 
Privileging a role-based responsibility can put lawyers into the position of being regarded by the 
public as, in effect, ‘amoral technicians.’32  When these ‘amoral technicians’ bring expert witnesses 
to aid their client’s case the witnesses are mere instruments of the case and in simply doing what 
they are meant to do, lawyers will inevitably put pressure on their experts to adopt the normalised 
practices of the law. As professionals already pre-disposed to prefer the interests of the client over 
others, little pressure is likely to be needed for an expert witness to move from independent to 
partisan evidence. They already have an interest in presenting evidence that suits the contracting 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
wealthier parties, without necessarily serving the interests of justice. Family Court of Australia, “The Changing 
Face of the Expert Witness” (Discussion paper) (Family Court of Australia, 2002) p 8. 
28 Postema G, “Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics” (1980) 55 New York University LR 63 in Luban D 
(ed), The Ethics of Lawyers (Dartmouth, 1994). 
29 Wasserstrom R, “Lawyers As Professionals: Some Moral Issues” in Luban D, n 28. 
30 Wasserstrom, n 29, p 7. 
31 
Chesterton GK, “The Twelve Men”in Postema G, n 30, p 69n.  
32
 Wasserstrom, n 29, pp 7-10. 
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party’s case: do a good job and solicitors are likely to seek you out for more work. A good job is most 
likely to be construed as doing or saying that which is likely to help the case succeed. 
ETHICS OF WITNESSES 
What counts as an expert and how should they and their legal teams behave?  
The Family Court of Australia discussion paper noted earlier33 identifies three types of expert 
witness: an expert witness who is called by one of the parties and who provides their evidence for 
the benefit of the party calling them; a single expert appointed by and instructed by both parties; 
and a court-appointed expert. The Planning and Environment Court in Queensland has another way 
to use experts: where experts are brought together before being briefed by their respective counsel. 
The State Administrative Tribunal in Western Australia recently instituted chaired conferrals of 
expert witnesses (through a change to standard order 47). And the Supreme Court Rules and the 
Civil Procedure Rules34 tell us also that as well as being engaged to give evidence on behalf of a 
party, experts may also be engaged as advisors to the court. Experts as advisors are not involved in 
the litigation and their identity need not be revealed to the other parties or to the court. The Civil 
Procedure Rules give the court control over the use of expert evidence and the court must give its 
permission for expert evidence to be called.35 
It is most common in our adversarial legal system for each party to employ its own experts. And 
whilst it is at the court’s discretion that a witness can be considered an expert, and thus be able to 
present opinion evidence, it is part of the duties of legal counsel to prepare the witness for the 
court. This is an area of considerable importance for the ethics of expert evidence. 
As science and technology become more complex, the role of expert witnesses has become 
increasingly important and across the common law jurisdictions ‘the selection and preparation of 
the expert witness has been and will prove to be at the cornerstone of much successful litigation’.36 
However, as Sydney barrister Hugh Stowe notes, preparation of expert witnesses creates an ethical 
tension that goes to the heart of the legal culture in jurisdictions such as Australia. ‘Witness 
preparation,’ he says, ‘is both an essential tool for the elucidation of truth in an adversarial system, 
                                                             
33 Family Court, n 27.  
34 Supreme Court (Australia) Rules Part 36, r13C(1), Civil Procedure Rules Part 35, r35.2. 
35
 The same applies in the United States where Rule 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (1974) states that the 
court decides whether someone can be admitted as an expert. The US Federal Rules of Evidence also give 
guidance on experts at Rule 702, which says that  
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education 
may testify thereto in the form of a opinion or otherwise. 
36
 Bogorich R and Goldstein L, “Reflections On The Role Of The Expert Witness” (Bogorich and Associates, 
2003). http://www.bogoroch.com/media/pdf/expert-witness.pdf. Accessed August 2012. 
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but also a possible tool of truth’s distortion.’37 Despite the clear injunctions in Australian jurisdictions 
that the expert is there to serve the court, and that practitioners have a paramount duty to the court 
and the administration of justice, there remains dramatic divergence in the way practitioners regard 
and respond to the need to prepare expert witnesses.  
Preparing witnesses is an important part of the ethical duty of solicitors who: need to ensure that 
the opinion is expressed in a way that can be admitted into evidence; need to test the soundness of 
the reasoning on which the opinion is based; and need to help witnesses be able to articulate their 
evidence in a way that can support a case.38 There are also specific ethical duties for barristers 
covering how they should deal with witnesses. In Western Australia, where I am writing this, a 
number of relevant duties are expressed in the Western Australian Bar Association’s Conduct 
Rules,39 under Integrity of Evidence (Rules 43-49). Rule 48 is noteworthy in that it covers the 
commonly-held notion that there is no property in a witness.40 That there is no property in a witness 
implies that counsel may confer with any witness willing to do so – including expert witnesses. But 
these duties of barristers do not prevent adversarial bias: a bias based in the fact that the expert is 
giving evidence for one party, a party that has chosen the expert and that will be invoiced for the 
expert’s services. This bias may arise from: selection bias, selecting an expert whose known views 
suit the contracting party’s case; deliberate partisanship or; unconscious partisanship.  
While it is the case that under Australian advocacy rules counsel are not allowed to suggest the 
content of evidence, or coach or encourage the witness to give evidence different from the evidence 
that he or she believes to be true, the questions they ask and the way they are asked will necessarily 
slant evidence. Solicitors may even feel that they are justified in preparing a witness at the limit of 
ethical acceptability (or beyond) if they know they are likely to face especially skilled opposition and 
brutal cross-examination.  That preparation may even, properly, include helping experts write their 
                                                             
37
 Stowe H, “Preparing Expert Witnesses: A Search For Ethical Boundaries” 72 (May) Law Society Journal (2007) 
pp 71-78. 
38 Stowe, n 37, p 73. 
39 Western Australian Bar Association. Conduct Rules (2006) 
http://www.wabar.asn.au/images/WABA_Conduct_%20Rules_as_at_15_Feb_2006.pdf. The duties can be 
characterised as negative duties in which the following are to be avoided: conferring with witnesses together; 
coaching witnesses; intimidating or coercing witnesses; asserting property in a witness or; communicating with 
a witness during cross examination. 
40 Harmony Shipping Co SA v Saudi Europe Line Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 1380, 1386, 1387; Wimmera Industrial Metals 
Pty Ltd v Iluka Midwest Ltd [2002] FCA 653, [46]. For these cases and the relation of Rule 48 to expert 
witnesses I am indebted to Steytler C D, “Prescriptive and Proscriptive Duties of a Barrister” (Speech delivered 
at the Western Australian Bar Association CPD weekend, Western Australia, 31 Oct. 2009). 
http://www.wabar.asn.au/images/Prescriptive%20and%20Proscriptive%20Duties%20of%20a%20Barrister%20
(The%20Hon%20Christopher%20Steytler%20QC)_%203.pdf.  
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reports at least so that their evidence addresses the legal tests of admissibility.41 However, as Stowe 
notes, ‘the ethical and legal limits to the role of lawyers in drafting expert reports are very 
controversial’ and it has become common practice in some jurisdictions ‘for lawyers to be involved 
in the actual drafting, either during or following a conference with the expert.’42  Some sort of 
template for appropriate help in drafting reports is needed43 because the more that lawyers are 
thought to be involved in the preparation of a report the less likely it is that experts will be thought 
to be independent and impartial and the less weight a court is likely to give to the experts’ evidence.  
However, we should not be surprised that experts are prepared, even coached, by counsel. As 
Justice Sperling noted 
the actual role of the expert witness, particularly in major litigations, is that the expert is part of the team. 
He…contributes to the way the case is framed and indirectly to decisions as to what evidence is to be got in to 
provide a basis for his opinion. His report is honed in consultation with counsel. Then, when it comes to the trial, 
he is a front line solider, carrying his side’s argument on the technical issues under the fire of cross-examination. 
Natural selection ensures that expert witnesses will serve the interests of their clients in this way.
44
 
Most Australian judges encounter evidence that is not in a comprehensible form, so preparing 
witnesses is necessary, in particular preparing experts so that they may present evidence in a way 
that the court may readily understand.  However, preparing witnesses and assisting them to present 
the team’s message can damage justice. How can that damage be limited? 
ENSURING TRUSTWORTHINESS 
It may seem that the best approach to limiting the damage done by improper preparation of a 
witness is to tighten the rules covering conduct. However, such a strategy may stumble over what 
noted British philosopher Onora O’Neill calls the paradox of trust.45 Trust is central to the whole 
question of the ethics of expert evidence, but it is unlike other ethical concepts because it is more 
basic than a principle or value and should be seen more properly as part of the necessary ground on 
which a society rests and on which a profession depends.46 Trust is glue that helps hold a society 
together.  
                                                             
41 Stowe n 37, p 75, citing Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) [2003] FCA 893. 
42 Stowe, n 37, p 75. 
43 Stowe, n 37, p 75. 
44 Sperling, n 3. 
45 O'Neill O, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
46
 Millett S, “Trust, Responsibility And Being Professional”(Paper presented at the 2
nd
 International Conference 
on Engineering Professional Ethics and Education, Kuala Lumpur, 17-19 May 2011). 
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A useful view of trust is ‘to say "A trusts B" means that A expects B will not exploit a vulnerability A 
has created for himself by taking the action.’47 Those who trust take a risk. We can seldom be certain 
that this or that person is trustworthy and we must take a risk that they are, in fact, trustworthy. 
Trust is the basis of fiduciary relationships both moral and legal. And fiduciary relationships underpin 
professional obligations. Yet these very relationships can also undermine justice as the fiduciary 
obligation to act in the interests of the client may well impede an expert from making a truly 
independent statement to the court because, while the various codes of conduct for witnesses 
require that an expert provide unbiased assistance to the court, the reality is that he or she is usually 
paid by one of the parties and will feel an obligation to the party paying the bill – not least because 
there may be future work as an expert witness at stake. 
Trust is something that all involved cannot do without and trustworthiness is a characteristic that 
should apply equally to the lawyers and the experts in cases where expert evidence is called.48 It may 
seem that to strengthen trust we should simply legislate for such things as compliance or create 
enforceable codes designed to ensure it. But any attempts to legislate or codify for trust come up 
against a paradox in which the more formal effort is put into ensuring trust – efforts such as 
compliance audits, codes of ethics and the like – the less likely is it that trust will be enhanced as 
‘increased demands for trustworthiness and stronger regulation of professionals… have lead (sic) not 
to a restoration of trust but to claims of escalating mistrust’.49 In effect, members of the public will 
ask: if members of that profession are trustworthy, why does the profession need legislation or rules 
which, if broken, will likely lead to punishment? The paradox is coupled with a dilemma: don’t 
legislate or create tighter rules and there may be little to ensure that X can be trusted to act in 
certain ways; or do legislate and undermine the community’s perception of X’s inherent 
trustworthiness. Despite the paradox and the dilemma, trust remains a sort of social glue. And while 
all those in a society have an obligation to be trustworthy, professionals have a greater obligation to 
do so than others. 
                                                             
47 James H Jr, “The Trust Paradox: A Survey Of Economic Inquiries Into The Nature Of Trust And 
Trustworthiness” (2001) http://129.3.20.41/eps/mic/papers/0202/0202001.pdf. 
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In the Civil Procedure Rules expert evidence must, where possible, be in written form. Despite this, 
damage to testimony and to the witness may still occur through cross-examination. This is 
particularly acute in jurisdictions that have not brought in strategies to mitigate such problems.  
One of the significant methods by which the problems of using experts can be mitigated is the use of 
concurrent evidence. In Australia the practice of giving concurrent evidence was brought into the 
mainstream in 2003, principally by Justice Peter McClellan who introduced it into the New South 
Wales Land and Environment Court and then when he moved to the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales introduced the practice there in 2006.50 Concurrent evidence is now most widely used in the 
State Administrative Tribunal51 where the guidelines are based specifically on the expert witness 
practice directions of the New South Wales Land and Environment Court.52  
The SAT has adopted an expert evidence model with four main elements that: spell out expert 
witnesses’ obligations to the Tribunal; require written statements of expert evidence; require 
experts to confer and present joint statements; and require experts to give evidence concurrently at 
the final hearing.53  
The SAT’s guide advises experts that they have  
‘an overriding duty to assist the Tribunal impartially on matters relevant to the expert's area of expertise’ that 
they have a ‘paramount obligation … to the Tribunal and not to the party engaging the expert’; [and that] ‘an 
expert witness is not an advocate for a party’. 54 
SAT deputy president Judge David Parry notes that ‘one of the benefits of concurrent expert 
evidence is that it provides expert witnesses with a considerably more comfortable and professional 
experience than the traditional method of taking expert evidence’ in which there is a ‘forensic battle 
with counsel’.55 However, concurrent evidence does not prevent partisanship and intransigence and 
the joint submissions prepared in conference will still likely contain areas of disagreement. The 
presentation of concurrent evidence does not create a consensus document and nor does it 
preclude experts being pressured by their own side or from being fiercely cross-examined by the 
other side – where each expert will need to be alert to the bias that may be implicit in questions put 
by counsel. More experienced witnesses will develop strategies to sidestep biased questions but 
                                                             
50 Parry D, “Concurrent Expert Evidence” (Brief, August 2010) pp 8-12. 
51 http://www.sat.justice.wa.gov.au/ (accessed August 2012) 
52 State Administrative Tribunal, n 25. 
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doing so may aid partisanship more than avoid it.  Expert witnesses will likely perceive that they 
have a fiduciary obligation to the party who pays them and will likely continue to put a case that is at 
least minimally partisan. 
CODES 
We may think that professionals can be trusted, in part, because they have professional codes. But 
relying on professional codes faces a problem similar to relying on professionals employing the same 
intellectual rigour in court as they would in their daily professional lives. If we adapt the test spelled 
out in Frye vs. United States we might see that even if a professional were to follow the ‘same ethical 
rigour’ as required by a professional code it may not be enough because some of the professional 
codes tend to be ‘vague and broad and do little to enforce ethical conduct by experts’.56 There is too 
much moral ‘wriggle room’ in that the professional may justify certain behaviours in court as being 
consistent with the code. Relying on extant professional ethics codes may not be enough.  
If we adapt Daubert vs Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, we might argue that the courts should not 
defer to the ethical codes of professional associations. British, Australian, Canadian and some other 
jurisdictions, have been able to achieve this by adopting or adapting the principles of expert 
evidence established by Mr Justice Cresswell in the 1993 UK shipping case The Ikarian Reefer.57 
Codes of conduct for expert witnesses have been created and implemented in a number of 
Australian jurisdictions and by a number of bodies. These include the New South Wales Supreme 
Court Rules, part 39; New South Wales Uniform Civil Procedure Rules58; Federal Court Practice 
Direction; the Family Court of Australia; the Western Australian State Administrative Tribunal; and 
the District Court of Western Australia59. These are based predominantly on the principles 
established in The Ikarian Reefer. These principles can be summarised as: 
1. Expert evidence should be the independent product of the expert, uninfluenced by the 
needs of the litigation 
2. The expert witness should provide independent assistance to the court by way of objective 
unbiased opinion 
3. An expert should state the facts or assumption on which his opinion is based 
4. An expert witness should make it clear when a question or issue is outside his expertise 
5. If an expert opinion is not properly researched because he considers insufficient data is 
available then this must be stated with an indication that his opinion is provisional 
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Ethics p 218. 
57 The Ikarian Reefer, n 24 . 
58 New South Wales Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (2005) Schedule 7. 
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6. If for any reason an expert changes his view on a material matter this should be 
communicated to the court and all parties without delay 
7. Where expert evidence refers to photographs, plans, calculations, survey reports or other 
similar documents these must be provided to the opposite party at the time reports are 
exchanged. 60 
The Ikarian Reefer guidelines do not remove the problems,61 but they are a good start. 
VIRTUOUS LAWYERS 
Attempts to mitigate harms generated by an adversarial system are important, but there needs also 
to be some effort taken to undertake what William May considers ‘the reshaping of the professional 
character and virtue’62 of lawyers, starting with reconsidering the extent to which a lawyer is to be a 
partisan for the client and the extent to which ‘zeal’ for the client should be replaced with something 
like ‘diligence’. It needs also to address deepening the Aristotelian virtue of ‘practical wisdom’, or 
phronesis.  
Phronesis, sometimes called the queen of virtues, is the amalgamation of skills or technical know-
how, and the intellectual and moral virtues. A virtuous lawyer would bring together: the skills of 
communication, active listening and persuasiveness; the intellectual virtues of professional 
competence, professional judgment and a sense of balance and; the moral virtues of honesty, 
integrity, respect for people, trustworthiness, diligence and so on. 
Exercising practical wisdom needs also to be coupled with sympathy, but sympathy understood in a 
particular way. The concept of sympathy has a long history going back to at least the ancient Chinese 
philosopher Mencius. And for both David Hume and Adam Smith moral sentiments – in essence 
something we feel – are the foundation of human morality, and sympathy is a moral sentiment. A 
very useful contemporary understanding of sympathy that builds on the history of the concept is 
from Stephen Darwall for whom sympathy is:  
a feeling or emotion that (a) responds to some apparent threat or obstacle to an individual's good or well-being, 
(b) has that individual himself as object, and (c) involves concern for him, and thus for his well-being, for his 
sake.63 
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Darwall’s approach involves an agent reaching out to understand the other’s individual situation; 
and having concern for the other’s wellbeing for the other’s sake. Sympathy is felt from the 
perspective of ‘one-caring’:  the key issue, though, is that concern is for the other’s sake. 
How this can operate in an environment where perceived fiduciary duty to a client dominates is an 
issue for the legal profession as a whole, but goes to the heart of the role-based morality that has 
the capacity to undermine the public’s trust in the law and lawyers. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It should be clear that the ethics of expert evidence encompasses the ethics of those giving 
evidence, those preparing the expert witness, those examining the witness, and those who must 
decide on the evidence. It should also be clear that the ethics of expert evidence is played out within 
a context in which, ultimately, the law holds the trump card.  
The ethics of giving expert evidence are influenced by conflicting duties: duties to the court 
generally, and specifically as described in the various codes for witnesses; fiduciary duties to a client, 
duties the interplay of which determine whether a witness survives a process that Justice Sperling 
calls ‘natural selection’;64 and a moral fiduciary duty on all parties to ensure that there continues to 
be public trust in the law. 
The ethics of those who must work with the evidence (and opinion) will be influenced by many 
factors. But with respect to expert evidence there is an especially strong need for those involved to 
challenge the ideology that paints science as the arbiter of truth and fact, and the methodology of 
the science used in evidence, lest poor science or poor arguments using science be the basis of a 
decision both of the case at hand and of future cases through precedent. 
Those preparing, examining and cross-examining a witness have competing fiduciary obligations: a 
generalised obligation of trust to the community at large; a fiduciary duty to their profession and the 
court; and a specialised fiduciary obligation to the client. The manner by which they negotiate these 
obligations of trust will, in part, be a demonstration of their moral virtue and that of their profession.  
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